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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
81\\.TE OF

L-.-Tl~. H

J:llain.ti ff an-d R espo·nd en.t,
~vs.-

~LERRILL RIVENBURGH,
JR.. , and l_JJ~~OXARD \\rltRNER
BOWNE,
De fen da:nts and A p pelloots.

)LA.CK

Case
No. 9089

APPELLANT BOWNE'S PETITION
FOR RE-HEARING

The Appellant I.Jeonard 'Varner I3.o,vne respectfully
requests the Court t.o set aAide its decision heretofo1·e
rendered on September 71 1960, and to grant a re-hearing
in the above entitled matter for the reason that said decision is not in aceordance 1v1 t11 the la'v in that;

POINT
THE APPELLANT \VAS DENIED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN THAT UTAH
CODE ANN. ~ 77-30-2 (1953) IS VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES)
AMEND. XIV~ AND THE COURT MISCON~
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STRUED APPELLANT'S POINT .AND ARGU:MENT IN THIS REGARD AS IT WAS STATED

IN HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL.
rrhe Appellant Bowne submits here,vith a brief
memorandum in support of the foregojng petition.

Dated NovenJber 4} 1960.
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IN THE SUPRE~1E COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
srr.\reE OF

l:T~\

lf

l)!a/nt;.tr aud llrst)ondetlf,.

- -,.s. ~

'l~\\ 1 l( ~1ERRILL

RI\TEXBCl{Gll,

).

Case
:\o. 9089

Jlt., and LE():\ARD "\VA RX~:R
lH)\V~E,

Defc·JJ fl (J..Jt.f:.s· au d .J ppPlla·nts.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

POI:\T
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN THAT UTA.H
CODE ANN. ·~· 77-30-2 (1953) IS VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES~
AMEND~ XIV, AND THE COURT MISCONSTRUED APPELLANT~S POINT AND ARGL1MENT IN THIS REGARD AS IT WAS STATED
IN HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL.
The main point of appeal 'vhieh the ..:\ppellant Bo,vne
relied upon "·n~ misconstrued l)y the (}ourt. It is his posi~
3
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t.ion that he ,\·us denied the cquul protection of the la,vs in
that [tah Code Ann. ~ 77 -30-~ (1953) is violative of the
(~onstitut.ion of

the l.Jnited States, Amend. XIV. The
(~on rt in itR opinion states as follov. ~~:._;;
'' (~oun::;e] for Bov-.'ne at·krlO,vledges the lavl of
t l1 e N emier rase but V{as attempting to lay a foun . .
dation for the Constitutional question, primarily
on the clause of the equal protection of the laws,
on the th-eory that Riren.b 1-1.rqh had 10 atul two challenges, 1.r l1 c rr' as h ·is (·h f? l J t o u 7y h a (I t u~ o r·hal1wn.ges.,, ( ~~mphasis supplied)
rfhc Court then proceeds to analyze the case

this
theo1·y, and finally eon-elude:.-:; tl1n t t11cre is no denial of a
constitutional right
Oil

the theory of the appellant Bov.-Tne. .A.
recitation \vas ineludcd in appellant\.; brief indicating
that Bo,vne had conditionally agreed to the selections of
the defendant Rivenburgh. Thi~ V{as merely by way of
explanation. ..A. t no time luis Ro,vne argued that he '-ras
denied the equal protection of the laws in that the othel'
uef endant, Rivenburgh "\\TaA able to exercise a greater
n unl ln~ 1· of peremp1 or y e ha ller1 gl~~.
rrh lR was

HOt

The appel1ant Bo,vne \3 theory in regards to the 14th
.Amendment \Vas not restricted i o a consideration of one
joint defendant in the case as against the other joint defendant in tlte case. The class "~1liell ,\~e \\~tt'e concerned
'vith "·as tllat of all and nny joint defendants in any
(·riTnina1 cH~(\ lf any joint defendant ran not agree 1vi.th
tJ1e other joint defendants as to the exercise of peremptory challenges, then he is d(~llt()d the right to those ellalSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lenges as g-ran tc·d in Utah ( ~od t\ ~A..nn § 77 ~30~ L)

( 1953).

"Under the triaJ court'~ ruling and under Ctah Code .1\.nn.
§ 77-30-2 ( 1953) ( v.; hi (•}! modifies ~ 7 7-30-15 as to join~ defendants), a c1 a st.; is constituted \V hich ineludcs all joint
defendants who cannot agree as to the exercise of the
peremptories. If the appellant had not been tri(ld jointly
he \vould have been able to exereise all of the perempt.orie~ granted under ~ 7'7-30-15. Since he \VB.~ tried jointl;J
and could not agree 'vith the other defendant as to the
(l x ereise of the peremptories, he -~ras limited to 0111 y 1\VO
peremptorif~ s

under

07 7-30-2+

From 1878 until 19B5~ 1Ttah had a statute v.rhich entitled any person charged 'vith a felony to a separate triaL
See Section 105.32.,6 of the Revised Statutes of 19B:t .i\.H
long as a joint defendant had the right to demand a
scpa rate trial, he had the means to insure that he \Vould
receive at least as man~y peremptory challenges as ,~.-{l-I~C
provided for in § 77-30-15. In Peopte v. 0 'Laughlin, :-)
lTtah 133~ 1 Pac. 653 (1882), the Utah (~ouri reject eel
sound argument or counsel for the defense to the effect
that each joint defendant should be entitled to. exercise
tl!·P full number of peremptorics . The reason the (~ourt so
acted was clearly stated as follo\rR:
~~By

the .~tutute riot is made a felony, and se(·tion 262 of the <~riminal procedure act giYCS to any
ueferulaut jointly inrlicted 'vith another or others,
for a felony, the right to a . . ·epa.rate f·rial, if he requires it. .:\.ll the defendant~ having v.ta1ved tl1is
priv1lcge and cleclared thci r election to be i ried
jointly, their defcn~e 'vas joint and not several,
and no one of them had authority to control the
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conduct of the defense~'' (Id. at 1 Pae. 656) ( ~m
phasis supplied)
section 105-32~6 ''"as amended to read
~uhstantially the same as lTtall Code A HTI, § 77 r31-6
( 1~~;)3). l,rom that time to the pres~nt, a joint defendant
ba8 lHnl no right to demand a separate:_:. triaL A separate
t r iaI rna~-' onl }' be grant (~ d i n t.h e d i ~ {·n ·t.i on of t l1 e t riu I
j uuge4 The la 'vs of this state no longer insure that a joint
defcnrlnHt \vill hav·e tl1e Tigl1t to the fn11 uuml~t~r of peremptory challenges granted by § 77" -30-l.j. A separate
elass is tln1s created l~y ~ 7T-30-2, and joiut defcnd.a11ts

On .JJ areh 14,

193;J~

\rho cannot agree n:--1 i.o the

~xerciRe

of peremptory

chal~

lenges, and thus find themselves iTi tlHl.t c~1a1-3~, are limitt~d
to t'vo pcreinptories, if lhe offensP charged is punishab1t·
l}y d(la th~ or one peremptory, if the ofTen~e rharged is not
punif~hable by deatlt 'Th1~ claRs is~ of course, to be eontrasted ''"ith defendants generally ,\·ho in similar eirrumstanees \Vould be e11tit.lerl to exercise the n1unbcr of
pt:remptories provided for in ·-~- i i -30-15~ \\-llich reads as
follovrs:
"Tl1e state and defend. ant ~hall each be al1o"·ed
the follo,ving nurn bl\r of peremptory eha1lenges ~
( .u) Ten, if the ofT{\11 ~P r.harged is puni~ha blc
hy death.

(b)

~~our~

if the oiTen~(l eharged is a felony not
punishable by death.

(c) rrhree, if the offen~e rhargetl is a mis •.lemeanor. ~"

It is cleat that a joint dPfP11dant "\Yho (_~annot agrc(l
,\-[ t.h the oth<\ r joint d( •fenrl.nn t s ~l ~ to the PXl tl' [se of per1

6
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Pmptory t~hnlleuges \viii lut \·e under ·§ 77-30-2~ the right to
t)Xl~rei~( . far fe,vcr peremptories than a defendarlt "\vho
i~ tri (~d sepa ru ttl)"· . In fact in tl1e instant case the appellant 'vas l't~Htri('i()d to only t'vo peremptory clJallenges.
Even n defendant charge1l with a misdemeanor i.s entitled
tP three 11cremptory challenges. See l~tah (~our~ Ann .
f. 77-30-13 ( 19;]3). In othct \vorrls, ~ "77 -30-2 d iffp rentia tes
be~ 'vr.cn

t'vo classes of defendants one of \vhieh i8 ex-

cluded from the suhstaiJtive provisjons or § "77-30-15~ rrhe
effect of this section is to discriminate against any joint
defendant "rho cannot agree 'vith tl1e others.
This Court set forth the proper standard \Vith v,rhich .

to determine the constitutionality of an act "'hich i~ q ucstioned as denying the equal protection of the la"\V8 in l)la.fe
v .JJ as(h 1, 94 C tah 501, 78 P ~ 2d 920 ( 1938) ~ In tltis case,
'vhi(_~J• has h(~come a clast:Ji(' to students of jurisprudence,
Justice Wolf indicated that a denial of equal proteciion,
in oruer to be unconstitutional, required diserjmii~ation
whic.h 'vas unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court f11rt.her
stated as follows:

''It is only v.rhere son1e persons or transactions
exrlnded from the operat.ion of the lfl"\V are as to
the subject matter of the Ia1\' in no differentiable
elass from those included i11 its operation that the
Ju-,v is discriminatory in the sense of lleing arhitrat~y and uneonst1tutioual. If a reasonable basis
to differentiate those i11eluded from those exeluded
from it~ operation caJt be found, it must be held
constitutionaL''

'Vhat is the differentiation. bei\\'cen the elassPs

(~reat

ed by~ 77-30-2? The only differentiation is the procedural

7
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aspect of a joint triaL Certainly this is not. a reasonable
differentiation. The differentiation has nothing to do \\. itl1
the crime charged. Tlle defendant ir1 either class must
make his O\Vn defense)' and if he is unsur.ce~sful, the defeJldRnt in either clasg must pay for the crime personal1y.
The differentiation is unreasonable in vi0"v of the faet that
the defendant ca nnoi determine the class in '\\! hich he may
find himselt The basis for the Court's reasoning i11
People v~ O'IAJ.ughiin~ s-upra; l1as disallJH.~,;lred. 'Vhether
a clef endant is included in the operation of § 7 7-.30-15 or
excluded by virtue of ~ 77-30-2 has notlrin~ tu do "\\·itl1 h1~
O\VTI intcn1. or po\ver ...~ significant indication of the arbitrary nature of this differentiation lies in the fact that
the deputy county attorney, \\:ho perchance drafts the
eomplaint, l1as more control over the class in vthicl1 a
drfendant "\\ill be placed than any otlu}r person. In t.he
in~tant case one of throe persons implicated in the crime
v.ras tried separately)' while the appellant Bo,vne was
tried jointly v..ith another . In all substantive aspects the
classes are the same~ It is not reasonable to discriminate against a defendant merely because, for the convenience of the state, he is triod jointly with others . Such a
rul~ can only be productive of abuse and injustice . Such
a rule makes shallow mockery of our Constitutional
rights.
r_r here is no rea so na ble basis upon

"\V hich

to differ--

entiate here. In attempting to deduce the purpose behind
the succcs.~ive net~ of the legislature, vle find f·ouflicting
intents \vhich can bt"~~t. be explained by inadvertence. In
granting a right to certain pcrempt.orie~, the legislaturr-

8
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di~p1ay\~d n n inteut to safc.guard a fair trial to everyone.

I?erempto ~"Y challenges are ordinarily held to be V\:ithin
t 11<.~ d i ~('l't~ 1i 0 !I of t IH_~ 1t~gisla turc . s(~(·1 ion '77 -~i0-15 gran ted
rig-hts 'vbirh under the majority rule, indiYidnals could
not demand us a matter of constitutional right.. Section
77-30-2 modified ·~ T7,30~1il to ar.r.ommoda.te a joint triul..

rl,he only vnHd purpose of§ 77-30-2 i~ to expedite the administration of justice. Certainly it "~aH not the intent
of the legislature to limit the joint def c11dH n t charged "- i th
a felony to any number of per em pto ry cha1lengr.8 short
of that set forth in ~ 77-30-15. The legis1at.uro in fact
granted the joint defendant cxtt·a challenges "\vhich could
be exercised separately. In the beginning and for fiftyseven years, these t'vo sections 'vere in perfect harmony
\\'ith the legislative intent to safeguard to aJl H J'ai l' trial.
During all of this time and until1935 if a joint defendant
coulrl not ag r·ee fl s to the C).:P. rr.i se of the peremptories,
then he could demand a separate trial and i llereby sceure
the full numller of peremptory cha1lcngcs provided l·or in
{. 77 -30-lj. "\Vhen the defendant could no longe I' demand
a separate trial, it bec.ame possible for ·~ 77-30-2 1o produce a re~ult r..ontrar~y to the origina1 legislat.i v<~ intent .

Sueh a result was achieved in the instant case. Had not
the defendant been in the elass excluded fTnm the op(~t·a
tion of ·~. 77-30-15 by ~ 77-30-2, lu; could have exercised
ten peremptory challenge~. ~\ 8 it vlas he -could e-xc t'(' i~e

but t\vo such challenges.
The purpo8e of cxpedieney is still present in
§ 77 -30-~. This is not ~ufficient to justify the arbitrary
differentiation found herein. Expediency must be
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\Veighed against our traditional guarantees of liberty and

justice. rrhe ron~titutional right. of the appellant to tllu
equal protection of the la.,vs far out,veigh8 any considerations of cxpcdi {~H(·y ..

ln tl1e opinion in the instant case, 'vhich \\~:IH r·elldered on Sf~pt.(_~nll)(_lr 7~ 1.960, the Court relies on t\vo California casef{. Both of t1u~sP (~as(ls ('an he di~tinguished
fro1n the instant fact situation~ In. Jl utler v. 11 ale, 138
Calif. 16:1, 7J PH(\ 81 ( 1902), the joint defcrldants joined
in challenging three jnror8~ The elcfend.a11t IIa ll· cllallcuged a fourth, but since the other defendant (the San
Franejs('o Di~tric~t. 'rclcgraph Company) refused to join
in this final challenge, the court overruled the ehallenge.
Tl~ e defendant Hale brought the a ppea.L The Califori1ia
con rt rej(~<"~ h_ld t 1~ L~ contc1~tion that lialc ";""as denied the
equal protection of the la,v.s. The court indicated that tlu·
same rule applied to all the parties to a·n a-(h.OJI V/here
t1Ley are united \vitl1 other~ either a.s plaint·iff ..: . or defr:jlda.n f R. } ll 1h l ~ c-i 1." if 8 e.tio ll the COUft C-On fin Cd its rcaSO ning
to a conAirlera.tion of the indivit"lual case and the parties
hefore it+ Tn a ei vil rase this may be quite proper~ In a
ciY1 ~ case one judgment only is recorded. One satisfaction pays for alL The court'~ concern is 11ecessa ril:- the
measure of fairne~s n~ hetVtTeen the parties before it. rrhis
is not so inn criminal case 'vhcre the measure of fairness
rcq u i r~)~ n 8i.-n-Nle j)rOcfdural .sla·udard for all who roay
he charged.
1n JJ eo1)l (' ,~. P-il b ro, 85 C~a L App. 789, :!60 Pac. 303

( 19:17), the defendant Pilhro refused to join in any of 1h (·
challenges nud rrtPl"Pl~· ~tated that he wa~ satisfied \vith

10
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the jury as it 'vas. In this criminal ca~~t the other defenuant, \\Ta 1sh~ brought the uppeal. It \viii he noted
llJa t in Loth J/ ull(Jr and Pilbo the appeiJant 'vas the dcr~·ndant \\ ho \\·as anxious to agree <l s to the chaUeng<.~S.
It [s not evident from the opinion in l)ilbro tl1at the con~titutional question of equal protection wHs even argued4
The JJ.utlr.r ease 'vas cited 'vit.h a brief explanation of its
holdin~. 11 i~ not apparent that this brief mentioJl of
equal protection in anything but dictum in the Pilbro case.
7

Certainly the theory of the Jl!uller case, \Vhieh apparently influenced the Court in the inst.ant case, is not
the theory upon ~,.hich the appellant Bo~e raised this
constitutional question. rrhe Court's opinion on this
point is shallo\V and ill-reasoned. rrhc Court Htatcs as
follo,vs:

"Section 77-30-2 docs not deny the equal protection of the laws, and thus violate the Fourteenth
~\mendment, for tho reason that the sa.m.e r-ule
applies to all ihe de/en-da~nt.~ ali.ke u::hen they are
frifd jointly amd does not d·;s(:r·i-rni-ua.f.e against a·n.y
on.e dr/e'J-ula·n-t \vhen the s1 n t.utc is follo,vcd f-H~ interpreted by the N cmier cn8e. In other V{orrls the
test of equal protert.ion undel" the HlH ute in question is not ba~ed on its appli{'rt t.ion to a joint defendant "\vho refuses to follo""· tl1c statute in the
r..olJeetive exereisc of his peremptory challenges~
as eontended h.v defendant Bo\vne. Sinec th.r. stat·
Ide a))pl ie.r.: the san~e to f"'fl(:h jnint dcfP·uda.nt ·t.}J. the
():1:ercise n.f f.h cir perr·u1 pto·ry chaUen.ge.~ collect·irr--:l/f, it is not discriminatory~ and Bo,vne was not
denied the equal proteet.ion of the la,v. n

With this reasoning the c:onrt could never find an unreason a hle differentiation betw·een class{~H ~Ti thin the
11
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meaning of t1ta:fe v~ Maso·n., supra.. The Court in fact looks
only to one class, and states that there is no dis-crimination since aiJ defendants within that one elass are treated .
equally. \V.itll this analysis the C·ourt cou1d justil\ a
statute which flatly provided that all persons tried
jointly (~ould exercise no peremptorics \vhatsoevr.r+ This
same reasoning \vould support a statute which denied
n.ny peremptory r.}Jtdlenges to defer1dants having- red hair~
since t11c same rule 1~.rould apply to all the defendants ~1like
\vhen they l1ad red hair and v,~ould not discriminate
against any one defendant.
~rhe C~ourt's

reasoning renders the 14th .Amendment
to the Constitution meaningless. W11ile it is true that in
construing a statute, a1l doubts should be resolved in
favor of ~onstitutionality~ this rule does not require 11~
to ignore the Constitution, or apply it in such a manner a.s to reduce it to a set of meaningless generalities~
the vestige of a determination to be governed by la,\~s
rather than men. If it is to have any meaning at all~ the
14th Amendment must be applied as suggested in State v.
Jl ason, supra.. Certainly § 77. .30-2 creates a separate
class of defendants, riz+, those tried jointly who calll~ ot
agree 'v-ith the other joint defendants as to the exercisr of
the peremptory challenges, the other class being all other
defendants granted rights under ~ 77-30-15. Certainly
there is d i~crimina tion, si nPe these defendants are excluded from t.he substantive provisions of ~ 77 -30~15 .
(\~rta[nly the discrimination is unreasonable and arbitrary. The t"tvo ela.sse~ of defc·Hdunts are in all r·espects
identiea l e X('t ~pt for the proc.edural aspect of tl ~e joint

12
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trial in one class4 There is no purpose which V{ould justify sueh a dificrentiation, in fact the legislature probably never intended it. When the 14th .ltmendment is
applied properly, there is only one ansvler, the appellant
Yras denied the equal protection of the la\\-'8 in that Utah
Code Ann . § 77-30-2 (1953) is violative of the Constitution
of the United State.s.
CONCLVSION

The Appellant Bov.7le respectfully urges that the
Court will find its decision rendered in this
untenable and therefore grant a re-hearing.

c_l

as e to be

Respectfully submittedt

HANSEN AND MILLER
Cownsel fo·r AppeUant Bown-e
410 Empire Building

Salt I Jake City, Utah
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